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Absztrakt 
A cikkben a kooperatív játékelmélet fogalmait alkalmazzuk egy Holt-Mogigliani-Muth-
Simon-típusú ellátási lánc esetében. Az ostorcsapás-hatás elemeit egy beszállító-termelı 
ellátási láncban ragadjuk meg egy kvadratikus készletezési és termelési költség mellett. 
Feltételezzük, hogy mindkét vállalat minimalizálja a releváns költségeit. Két mőködési 
rendszert hasonlítunk össze: egy hierarchikus döntéshozatali rendszert, amikor elıször a 
termelı, majd a beszállító optimalizálja helyzetét, majd egy centralizált (kooperatív) modellt, 
amikor a vállalatok az együttes költségüket minimalizálják. A kérdés úgy merül fel, hogy a 
csökkentett ostorcsapás-hatás esetén hogyan osszák meg a részvevık ebben a transzferálható 
hasznosságú kooperatív játékban a költség megtakarítást, exogén módon adott tárgyalási 
pozíció mellett. 
 
Kulcsszavak: Optimális irányítás, Ellátási lánc, Ostorcsapás-hatás, Kooperatív játékelmélet 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We apply cooperative game theory concepts to analyze a Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon 
(HMMS) supply chain. The bullwhip effect in a two-stage supply chain (supplier-
manufacturer) in the framework of the HMMS-model with quadratic cost functions is 
considered. It is assumed that both firms minimize their relevant costs, and two cases are 
examined: the supplier and the manufacturer minimize their relevant costs in a decentralized 
and in a centralized (cooperative) way. The question of how to share the savings of the 
decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized (cooperative) model is answered by the weighted 
Shapley value, by a transferable utility cooperative game theory tool, where the weights are 
for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain. 
 
Keywords: Optimal control, Supply chain, Bullwhip effect, Cooperative game theory, 
Weighted Shapley value 
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1 Introduction 
 
In the supply chain literature so far mostly non-cooperative game theory concepts were 
applied, see e.g. Kogan and Tapiero (2007) and Sethi at al. (2005), for an exception see. 
Dobos and Pintér (2010). In this paper we analyze supply chains by cooperative game theory 
tools. Our main question is that how the manufacturer and the supplier should share the 
savings they achieve by harmonizing their production plans. We apply the following 
cooperative game theory concepts: the core (Gillies (1959)) and the weighted Shapley value 
(Shapley (1953)) to answer the above question. The core concept expresses that the 
considered allocation of the savings is stable, while the weights in the weighted Shapley value 
are for the exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the participants of the supply chain, that 
is, those describe how the participants share the savings as a function of their “bargaining 
powers”.  
In order to demonstrate the efficiency of cooperating in a supply chain we consider the so 
called bullwhip effect. The bullwhip effect explains the fluctuations of sales (demand), 
manufacturing and supply. The bullwhip effect was first observed by Forrester (1961), later 
Lee et al. (1997) rediscovered this phenomenon. They mentioned four basic causes of the 
bullwhip effect: lead-times and demand signal processing, order batching, rationing and 
gaming; and promotion effect, or price fluctuations. These effects were investigated e.g. by 
Disney et al. (2003). 
There are three basic models to investigate the decision processes of a firm: the 
Wagner-Whitin, Arrow-Karlin and the Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon (HMMS) model. These 
models have a stock-flow identity and a cost function. The difference between them lies in the 
cost functions. The well-known lot sizing model of Wagner and Whitin (1958) assumes a 
concave cost function. The basic model of Arrow and Karlin (1958) applies a linear holding 
and a convex production cost function. The model of Holt, Modigliani, Muth and Simon 
(1960) assumes a quadratic function for both the inventory holding and the production cost. 
The main goal of this paper is to demonstrate that the weighted Shapley value 
(Shapley (1953)), a cooperative game theory tool, can be applied to supply chain analysis. We 
consider an HMMS-type two-stage supply chain and analyse the bullwhip effect appearing in 
this model. To show that because of the bullwhip effect the cooperation of the manufacturer 
and the supplier induces savings, we develop two models: a decentralized and a centralized 
HMMS-type supply chain model.  
The decentralized model assumes that first the manufacturer solves her production 
planning problem (the market demand is given exogenously) and her ordering process is 
based on the optimal production plan. Then the supplier minimizes her costs on the basis of 
the ordering of the manufacturer. In the centralized model it is assumed that the participants 
of the supply chain cooperate, that is, they minimize the sum of their costs.  
In the next step we compare the production-inventory strategies and the costs of the 
manufacturer and supplier in the two models to show that the bullwhip effect can be reduced 
by cooperation (centralized model). This cooperation can be defined as a kind of information 
sharing between the parties of the supply chain.  
Finally, we discuss the question of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share 
the savings their cooperation induces. We assume that the “bargaining powers” of the 
participants are given by weights summing up to one, and share the savings according to these 
weighs. We demonstrate that, in this model this concept coincides with the weighted Shapley 
value (Shapley (1953)) and it is stable, that is, it is in the core (Gillies (1959)). 
The main differences between this paper and Dobos and Pintér (2010) are as follows: 
(1) Dobos and Pintér (2010) consider the Arrow-Karlin model (Arrow and Karlin (1958)), 
while in this paper we analyze the Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon model, so the two papers 
 4 
consider different management science situations. Moreover, (2) Dobos and Pintér (2010) 
assume that the manufacturer and the supplier have the same “bargaining powers”, that is, 
none of them can be considered as stronger than the other. In business, however, typically one 
of the participants is stronger than the other, that is, they do not have same “bargaining 
powers”. In other words, it is desirable to take care about the participants’ “bargaining 
powers” when we discuss the allocation of the savings achieved by the cooperation. In this 
paper, we apply the weighted Shapley value, in which the weights reflect the participants’ 
different “bargaining powers”.      
The paper is organized as follows. The decentralized model is discussed in Section 2. 
Section 3 analyzes the centralized (cooperative) supply chain model. In Section 4 we 
introduce some concepts of cooperative game theory and define supply chain (cooperative) 
games given by the models discussed in Sections 2 and 3. Moreover, we apply the above 
mentioned solution concepts of transferable utility cooperative games to answer the question 
of how the manufacturer and the supplier should share the savings, the result of their 
cooperation. An exact number example is given in Section 5. The last section briefly 
concludes. 
 
2 The decentralized system 
 
We consider a simple supply chain consisting of two firms: a supplier and a manufacturer. We 
assume that the firms are independent, that is, each makes her decision to minimize her own 
costs. The firms have two stores: a store for raw materials and a store for end products. 
Moreover, we assume that the input stores are empty, that is, the firms can order suitable 
quantity and that they can get the ordered quantity. The production processes have a known, 
constant lead time. The material flow of the model is depicted in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Material flow in the models 
 
The following parameters are used in the models: 
 
T length of the planning horizon, 
S(t) the rate of demand, continuous differentiable, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tIm  inventory goal size of manufactured product, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tI s  inventory goal size of supplied product, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPm  manufacturing goal level, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPs  supply goal level, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
hm inventory holding cost coefficient in manufactured product store, 
hs inventory holding cost coefficient in supplied product store, 
cm production cost coefficient for manufacturing, 
cs production cost coefficient for supply. 
Im(t) 
Supplier Manufacturer 
Production Production 
Pm(t) Pm(t) Pm(t) Ps(t) Ps(t) Ps(t) 
Is(t) 
S(t) 
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In the HMMS-model it is assumed that the management of the (manufacturer and supplier) 
firms have fixed a production-inventory pattern, that is, the production plans )(tPm  and )(tPs , 
and planned inventory levels )(tIm  and )(tI s  are known before the planning horizon. The 
objective of the managers of the firms is to minimize the deviations from the fixed objective 
level. The deviations are defined, as quadratic functionals with known parameters. This 
phenomenon was empirically tested by Holt, Modigliani, Muth, and Simon (1960). 
 
The decision variables: 
 
)(tIm  the inventory level of the manufactured product, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tI s  the inventory level of the supplied product, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPm  the rate of manufacturing, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ , 
)(tPs  the rate of supply, it is non-negative, [ ]Tt ,0∈ . 
 
The decentralized model describes the situation where the supplier and the manufacturer 
optimize independently, we mean the manufacturer determines its optimal production-
inventory strategy first (the market demand is given exogenously), then she orders the 
necessary quantity of products to meet the known demand. Then the supplier accepts the order 
and minimizes her own costs.  
 
Next, we model the manufacturer in this HMMS-environment. The manufacturer 
solves the following problem: 
 
[ ] [ ] min)()(
2
)()(
20
22
→






−+−= ∫ dttPtP
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m
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TtIItStPtI mmmm ≤≤=−= 0,)0(),()()( 0&      (2) 
 
Assume that the optimal production-inventory policy of the manufacturer is ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ dmdm PI  in model (1)-(2) and the manufacturer orders )(⋅dmP . Then the supplier solves the 
following problem: 
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TtIItPtPtI ss
d
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Notice that problem (3)-(4) has the same planning horizon [0,T] as that of model (1)-
(2). 
To solve problem (1)-(2) we apply the Pontryagin’s Maximum Principle (see e.g. 
Feichtinger and Hartl, (1986), Seierstad and Sydsaeter, (1987)). The Hamiltonian function of 
this problem is as follows: 
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This problem is an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. To 
obtain the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality we need the Lagrangian function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .),(),(),(),(),(),(),( tIttttPtIHttttPtIL mmmmmmmmmmm ⋅+= λψλψ  
 
Lemma 1 ( ))(P),(I dmdm ⋅⋅  is the optimal solution of problem (1)-(2) if and only if there exists 
continuous function )(m ⋅ψ  such that for all 0≤ t≤ T 0)( ≠tmψ  and 
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     (c)                                                ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt mdmm λλ ,                          
 
     (d)                                               ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT mdmm ψψ         
 
 
We do not prove the above lemma, its proof can be found in the above mentioned literature. 
The optimal solution can be easy constructed, if the optimal production rate and the optimal 
inventory level is positive in along the planning horizon. 
 
Lemma 2 Assume that production-inventory strategy ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ dmdm PI  is an optimal solution for 
model (1)-(2). Then the optimal solution must satisfy the following differential equation: 
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with initial and terminal condition 
 
)()(,)0( 0 TPTPII mdmmdm == . 
 
We do not prove this lemma, the proof can be found in Dobos (2003). If production strategy 
)(Pdm ⋅  is known, then problem (3)-(4) can be solved. 
After optimal production strategy )(⋅dmP  is given we can solve problem (3)-(4). The 
Hamiltonian function of problem (3)-(4) is as follows 
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This problem is also an optimal control problem with pure state variable constraints. 
To get the necessary and sufficient conditions of optimality, we need again the Lagrangian 
function: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ).),(),(),(),(),(),(),( tIttttPtIHttttPtIL sssssssssss ⋅+= λψλψ  
 
The proof of the following lemma can be found again in the mentioned literature. 
 
Lemma 3 ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ dsds PI  is optimal solution of problem (3)-(4), if and only if there exists 
continuous function )(⋅sψ  such that for all 0≤ t≤ T 0)( ≠tsψ  and 
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        (c)                              ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt sdss λλ , 
 
        (d)                             ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT sdss ψψ  
 
For the case of positive inventory level and production rate the optimal strategy is presented 
in the next lemma. 
 
Lemma 4 Let us assume that production-inventory strategy ( ))(),( ⋅⋅ dsds PI  is an optimal 
solution for model (3)-(4). Then the optimal solution must satisfy the following differential 
equation: 
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with initial and terminal condition 
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Later we use the following notations: let dmJ  and 
d
sJ  be the optimal values of cost 
functions (1) and (3) respectively, that is, let 
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3 The centralized system 
 
In this section we solve the centralized model, that is, the model, where the manufacturer and 
supplier coordinate their decisions. The model is as follows 
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The Hamiltonian function of model (5)-(8) is 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] .)()()()()()(
)()(
2
)()(
2
)()(
2
)()(
2
))(),(),(),(),(),((
2222
tPtPttStPt
tPtPctItIhtPtPctItIh
tttPtItPtIH
mssmm
ss
s
ss
s
mm
m
mm
m
smssmm
−⋅+−⋅+






−+−+−+−−=
ψψ
ψψ
 
 
The Lagrangian function is 
 
( )
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The following lemma formalizes the well-known optimality conditions. Its proof can be found 
in the literature mentioned in the previous section. 
 
Lemma 5 ( ))(),(),(),( ⋅⋅⋅⋅ cscscmcm PIPI  is optimal solution of problem (5)-(8), if and only if the 
following points hold 
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3)                                             ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt mcmm λλ , 
                                                ( ) ( ) ( ) 0,0 ≥=⋅ ttIt scss λλ , 
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         ( ) ( ) ( ) .0,0 ≥=⋅ TTIT scss ψψ  
 
The optimal centralized production strategies for the manufacturer and the supplier 
respectively are 
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These two equations are the optimal linear decision rules. (See Holt-Modigliani-Muth-Simon 
(1960).) Differentiating adjoint variables )(m ⋅ψ  and )(s ⋅ψ , and then substituting into the 
conditions, the necessary and sufficient conditions become a system of linear differential 
equations: 
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with initial and ending conditions 
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Finally, consider a notation: let cs
c
m
c
ms JJJ +=  denote the optimal value of cost 
function (5), where 
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





−+−=
0
22 )()(
2
)()(
2
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4 The cost sharing 
 
In this section we provide a sharing rule of the savings the cooperation induces. It is easy to 
see the following result: 
 
Lemma 6 dsdmcscmcms JJJJJ +≤+=≤0 . 
 
This result can be interpreted as follows: The total cost of the decentralized system, 
that is, the sum of the supplier’s and manufacturer’s costs is higher than that of the centralized 
system. The question is that now, how to share the savings induced by the players’ 
cooperation.  
 First, we introduce the concept of transferable utility cooperative games. Let N= {1, 
2,…, n} be the nonempty, finite set of the players. Moreover, let ℜ→Nv 2:  be a function 
such that 0)Ø( =v , where N2  is for the class of all subsets of N . Then v  is called 
transferable utility (TU) cooperative game, henceforth game with player set N .  
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Game v  can be interpreted as every coalition (subset of N ) has a value. E.g. NS ⊆  
is a coalition consisting of the players of S , and )(Sv  is the value of coalition S . The value 
of a coalition can be the profit the coalition members can achieve if they cooperate, or the cost 
they induce if they harmonize their actions.   
In our model there are two players: the manufacturer ( m ) and the supplier ( s ), that is, 
},{ smN = , and the value of a coalition is the cost the coalition members induce if they 
coordinate their production plans and inventory strategies.  
 In the decentralized model the players do not harmonize their actions, and achieve 
their minimal costs independently of each other. Therefore (see Subsection 5.1) 
 
d
mJmv =})({  
 
and  
 
s
mJsv =})({ . 
 
In the centralized model the manufacturer and the supplier form a coalition, that is, 
they cooperate. Therefore (see Subsection 5.2) 
 
c
msJsmv =}),({ . 
 
Henceforth let v  denote the supply chain game defined above. 
 To sum up the above discussion, the decentralized and the centralized model generate 
a (TU cooperative) game. 
To answer the question of how the players should share the savings their cooperation 
induces, we apply three solution concepts of cooperative game theory.  
First, we introduce the concept of core (Gillies (1959)). In our model the core of 
supply chain game v  is defined as follows: 
 
},,:{)( },{ dssdmmcmssmsm JxJxJxxxvC ≤≤=+ℜ∈= , 
 
where xm and xs are coordinates belonging to the manufacturer and the supplier respectively.  
 The core can be described as it consists of allocations of the total cost of the 
centralized model such that none of the players can be better off by leaving the centralized 
model, by stopping cooperation, that is, the core consists of stable (robust) allocations of the 
costs. It is easy to see that in this model the core is not empty, that is, there is a stable 
allocation of the costs. 
In our model the core has the disadvantage that generally it consists of many points, 
that is, it is a map-valued solution. Therefore, the following natural question comes up: How 
can we pick up only one point as a solution? Next we consider a point-valued solution. 
Let 0, sm ≥ωω  such that 121 =+ ωω , then mω  and sω  are called the weights of the 
manufacturer and the supplier respectively. These weighs can be interpreted as the 
exogenously given “bargaining powers” of the players.  
Shapley (1953) introduced the following point-valued solution concept: The weighted 
Shapley value of the manufacturer and the supplier respectively in supply chain game v  
 ( )dscmsmdmmm JJJvwSh −+−= ωω )1()( , 
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and 
 
( )dmcmssdsss JJJvwSh −+−= ωω 2
1)1()( . 
 
The weighted Shapley value can be interpreted as it is an adjusted (by the weights) 
expected value of the given player’s marginal contribution. In other words, e.g. the 
manufacturer’s weighted Shapley value is the expected value with the distribution 
( )mm ),1( ωω−  of the manufacturer’s marginal contribution to the cost of the two coalitions not 
containing her, to the empty collation ( dmJ ) and to coalition }{s ( dscms JJ − ).  
In the symmetric case, when the two players have equal power, that is, 
2
1
== sm ωω , 
)(vwShm  and )(vwShs  are the so called Shapley value of the manufacturer and the supplier 
respectively in game v .  
Next we show that in our model the Shapley solution is in the core, hence it is a real 
refinement of this map-valued solution concept. 
 
Lemma 8 For any supply chain game v  ( ) ( )vCvwShvwSh sm ∈)(,)( . 
Proof.  Let ),( sm ωω  be an arbitrary weight system. Take the manufacturer first: Lemma 4 
implies that 
 
d
mm
d
mm
d
s
c
msm
d
mmm JJJJJvwSh ωωωω +−≤−+−= )1()()1()( ,  
 
that is, dmm J)v(wSh ≤ . In a similar way we can see that dss JvwSh ≤)( .  
Finally, it is obvious that cmssm JvwShvwSh =+ )()(  (see e.g. Shapley (1953)).        ⁪ 
 
5 A numerical example 
 
Take the following parameters and cost functions in problems (1)-(2), (3)-(4) and (5)-(8), as 
in Table 1.  
 
 13 
Table 1. Parameter specification for the example 
 
In the following we solve the decentralized and the centralized problem. 
 
5.1 The solution of the decentralized problem 
 
The decentralized problem is a hierarchical production planning problem. First the 
manufacturer solves her planning problem, then the optimal ordering policy is forwarded to 
the supplier. Finally, the supplier optimizes her own relevant costs based on the known 
ordering policy of the manufacturer. 
The problem of the manufacturer is as follows: 
 
[ ] [ ] min1)(
2
15.0)(
2
25
0
22
→






−+−= ∫ dttPtIJ mmm  
s.t. 
 
50,25.0)0(,2)sin()()( ≤≤=−−= tIttPtI mmm&  
 
The optimal solution can be determined with help of Lemma 2, because the optimal inventory 
level and production rate are positive. Let the optimal the optimal solution be functions )(⋅dmP  
and )(⋅dmI . 
 
The minimal cost of the manufacturer is 4.604 units, that is, 604.4=dmJ . 
 
Description Data 
Length of planning horizon: T 5 
Demand rates: S(t) sin(t)+2 
Delay of the supply: τ 0.5 
Manufacturing rate goal level: )(⋅mP  1.0 
Supply rate goal level: )(⋅sP  0.85 
Inventory size goal level in manufacturing store: )(⋅mI  0.5 
Inventory size goal level in supply store: )(⋅sI  0.3 
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store: )0(mI  0.25 
Initial inventory level in manufacturing store: )0(sI  0.5 
Manufacturing cost coefficient: cm 1.0 
Supply cost coefficient: cs 0.5 
Inventory holding cost coefficient in manufacturing store: hm 2 
Inventory holding cost coefficient in supply store: hs 1 
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Figure 2. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the decentralized models 
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In the next step we solve the problem of the supplier, where the manufacturer’s 
ordering policy )(⋅dmP  is given: 
 
[ ] [ ] min85.0)(
2
5.03.0)(
2
15
0
22
→






−+−= ∫ dttPtIJ sss  
 
s.t. 
 
50,5.0)0(),()()( ≤≤=−= tItPtPtI sdmss&  
 
The optimal solution for the supplier is functions )(⋅dsP  and )(⋅dsI , applying the results of 
Lemma 4. 
 
The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
 
Figure 3. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the decentralized 
models 
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Pmd(t) 
)(tPds  
S(t) 
Imd(t) 
)(tI ds  
 15 
 
 
The minimal cost of the supplier is 2.335 units, that is, 335.2=dsJ . The total cost of 
manufacturer and supplier is 6.939 units in this decentralized strategy of the supply chain, that 
is 939.6=+ ds
d
m JJ . 
 
5.2 The solution of the centralized problem 
 
In the following we solve the centralized problem: 
 
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] min85.0)(
2
5.03.0)(
2
11)(
2
15.0)(
2
25
0
2222
→






−+−+−+−= ∫ dttPtItPtIJ ssmmms  
 
s.t. 
 
50,2)sin()()( ≤≤−−= tttPtI mm&  
 
50),()()( ≤≤−= ttPtPtI mss&  
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The optimal solution of this problem is given after the solution of the following differential 
equation (see (9)): 
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with initial and terminal conditions 
 

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
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

=


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s
m
I
I
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and 
 
.
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The optimal production rates and inventory levels are shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
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Figure 4. Optimal manufacturing and supply rates for the centralized model 
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Figure 5. Optimal manufacturing and supply inventory levels for the centralized model 
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The minimal cost of the centralized system is 6.887 units, where the manufacturer’s cost is 
4.656 units and the supplier’s cost is 2.231 units, that is, 887.6Jcms = , 656.4Jcm =  and 
231.2Jcs = . 
 
5.3 Comparison of the solutions of the decentralized and the centralized system 
 
First, compare the production rate and inventory level of the manufacturer and the supplier in 
the cases of the decentralized and the centralized system, where Imdt, Imct, Isdt and Isct are 
for the inventory level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized model respectively. 
 
)(tPcs  
Pmc(t
) 
S(t) 
 
Imc(t) 
)(tI cs  
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Figure 6 The inventory level of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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Figure 7 The inventory level of the supplier in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
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In this example the inventory level of the manufacturer decreases in the case of cooperation, 
that is, in the centralized system. The inventory level of the supplier first decreases, and then 
increases when the participants cooperate in the supply chain, see Figures 6 and 7. 
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Figure 8 The production rate of the manufacturer in the decentralized and the 
centralized system 
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As we see, the production level in the centralized system is smoother, that is, the growth of 
the production rate is smaller than that in the case of the decentralized system, and the 
contrary is true for the supplier, that is, in the decentralized system the production rate of the 
supplier is smoother than that in the centralized system, where Pmdt, Pmct, Psdt and Psct are 
for the production level for the manufacturer and for the supplier in the decentralized and the 
centralized models respectively, and S(t) is for the exogenously given demand, see Figures 8 
and 5. This phenomenon is the decreased bullwhip effect in the centralized model. 
 
Figure 9 The production rate of manufacturer in the decentralized and the centralized 
system 
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The optimal costs of the decentralized and the centralized problem are presented in Table 2. 
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Table 2. The optimal costs of the example 
 
 Decentralized 
problem 
Centralized 
problem 
Manufacturer costs (Jm) 4.604 4.656 
Supplier costs (Js) 2.335 2.231 
Total costs (Jms) 6.939 6.887 
 
 
As we have seen, the total cost of the centralized problem is lower than that of the 
decentralized one. The cost reduction is approximately 1%. In the centralized problem the 
manufacturer cost increases with more than 1% and the supplier cost decreases with 4.5%. 
After the above analysis the question of how to share the savings, the cooperation of 
the participants in the supply chain induces, comes on stage. 
 
5.4 Cost sharing 
 
Before we introduce the weighted Shapley value, we show graphically the core C(v) of the 
supply chain game. The core of our problem is defined, as 
 
}335.2,604.4,887.6:{)( },{ ≤≤=+ℜ∈= smsmsm xxxxxvC . 
 
Using the results from Table 2, Figure 10 presents the core of our supply chain game with a  
thick black line. 
 
Figure 10 The core 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Assume the manufacturer’s “bargaining power” is two times of the supplier’s, that is, 
3
2
=mω  and 3
1
=sω . The weighed Shapley value of the manufacturer and the supplier are  
57.4)( =vwShm  and 317.2)( =vwShs  respectively. It means that the players share their 
savings equally. The weighted Shapley value is shown in Figure 10, it is the ),( sm ωω -
xm + xs = Jmsc 
C(v) 
xm 
xs 
Jmd 
Jsd 
(wShm(v), wShs (v)) 
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weighted average of the two endpoints of the core, that is, 
),(),())(),(( dmcmsdmsdsdscmsmsm JJJJJJvwShvwSh −+−= ωω . 
Notice that, since the cooperation does not allocate the savings according to the 
exogenously given weights, a transfer between the supplier and the manufacturer is needed. 
As a result of cooperation the manufacturer cost increase and the supplier’s cost decrease, that 
is, all the savings go to the supplier. In order to reach the allocation, the parties agree on, that 
is, the weighted Shapley value a transfer is: the supplier must transfer 0.086 units to the 
manufacturer. It means that the manufacturer and the supplier agree on a contract such that 
the parties commit themselves to cooperate and the supplier commits herself to pay 0.086 
units to the manufacturer as a ”price” for his cooperation. 
 
6. Conclusion and further research 
 
In this paper we have solved two two-stage HMMS-type supply chain models: a decentralized 
and a centralized model. We have showed that the cooperation of the two players induces 
savings in costs. 
 In the next step we have considered sharing rules for the savings. We have applied 
cooperative game theory solution concepts to this problem, and we have introduced the 
concept of supply chain games. It was shown that in the two player supply chain games the 
core is not empty and that the weighted Shapley value is always in the core.   
 As an illustration for our results we have presented an exact number example. In this 
example the supplier’s cost of adaption in production to the fluctuations in the orderings of 
the manufacturer is higher than that of the manufacturer. Moreover, the production costs are 
dominant over the inventory costs. Therefore it is not surprising at all that in the centralized 
model the supplier has reduced her inventory level, and the manufacturer’s inventory level is 
higher than that in the decentralized model, and vice versa for the supplier.  
The reason of this fact is that the manufacturer minimizes her relevant cost in the 
decentralized model, so that her production level is near to the demand rate. After cooperation 
the manufacturer gives up to follow her cost optimal production strategy to allow the supplier 
to reduce her own production-inventory cost implying a decrease in the total cost of the 
supply chain as well, since the supplier’s cost saving balances out the increase of the 
manufacturer’s cost.  
This phenomenon points at the well known bullwhip effect of supply chains in a way: 
the supplier decreased the inventory level after information sharing (cooperation), and she 
adjusted her production rate closer to the demand rate. 
In this type supply chains the two players might have asymmetrical roles. It can 
happen that the manufacturer has much stronger bargaining position than that of the supplier 
or vice versa. To consider the asymmetric bargaining positions we apply the weighted 
Shapley value as solution concept for sharing the savings among the parties. The weights are 
for the supply chain participants’ “bargaining powers”, the bigger the weight, the stronger the 
given party’s “bargaining power”.     
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